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I
INTRODUCTION

Judge Weis's article frames important practical lessons. We start in the
United States with a plaintiff who plans to sue on a commercial or products
liability claim; her seller and anticipated defendant, a Japanese company, lacks
a wholly owned subsidiary in the United States. Each "party is free to select
the best law, best remedy, most pleasing procedural system; obtain a quick
judgment; and race to enforce it."' The plaintiff seeks service that will secure
home court jurisdiction before the statute of limitations runs, her choice of
forum substantive law, and a judgment she can collect in Japan, if necessary.2
The great opponents of change-ignorance, habit, and expense-militate against
the sound practical advice to plaintiff that leaps from Judge Weis's article: if
possible, the plaintiff should serve process through the Central Authority.3
II
CIVIL PROCEDURE AND FOREIGN RELATIONS

Let me focus on the intersection of U.S. procedural policymaking and the
treaty power and foreign relations. Judge Weis's article explores two themes
that run through U.S. civil procedure.
The first is counterintuitive
instrumentalism: rulemakers and courts emphasize management and processing
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based on the unarticulated notion that to aid an efficient system, people
involuntarily caught up in it will cooperate with alacrity in their own undoing.
Paradigm examples include waiver of service of process and automatic
discovery, each neatly backstopped with Rule 11 sanctions to deter litigants'
self-preservation instincts.4
Underlying pragmatism is the second, less fully articulated, theme: hermetic
definitions of sovereignty which date from Justice Field's nineteenth-century
conceptualism in Pennoyer v. Neff.' The Schlunk and Melia decisions Judge
Weis discusses are based on the Pennoyer theory: that the state, which lacks
power outside its borders, nevertheless has complete power over potential
defendants within those borders.6 The pragmatic antidote to Pennoyer's rigid
view of sovereignty is administered by fictional domestic agency which allows
the forum to tell itself and the defendant's home base that, because of the
fictional agency, service occurred within the forum. The profession has
assimilated these views of sovereignty and such fiction into its vernacular so
completely that sometimes we forget they persist. Judge Weis examines the
Schlunk and Melia opinions solely in terms of whether each service of process
was likely to result in actual notice to defendant; he did not touch on any
theories of sovereignty or jurisdictional powers upon which the decisions might
be based.
Professor Steve Burbank has advanced the point that jurisdiction and service
of process possess different qualities.7 Jurisdiction is obtained by exercise of
the state's power, whereas service of process affords defendant notice and the
opportunity to mount a defense. International service blends these two features.
Ritual, etiquette, mumbo jumbo, or whatever each of us calls it, is inherent in
the nature of sovereignty and territorialism; so long as shared norms are lacking,
the service ritual will persist. Our world is not the world.8 Differences in
language may skew translated communication. Language contains and conveys
substantial assumptions about law and society; shared tradition may even give
rise to divergent interpretations when they are colored by local shades of
meaning and nuance.
Commercial and transactional complexity creates
confusion, which only exacerbates incomplete communication.
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III
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Many of the world's legal systems regard the beginning of a lawsuit as a
more serious communication than a late utility bill.9 The new Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 4 allows a plaintiff to seek a waiver of service of process from
a foreign nation defendant; if defendants, lacking good cause, decline to waive,
then the cost of effecting formal service might be imposed. In proposing the
revised rule, the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
observed that a request for waiver "is a private, nonjudicial act that does not
purport to effect service or constitute any directive from a court,"1 which
waiver "will not offend foreign sovereignties, even those that have withheld
their assent to formal service by mail." 1 This is true only for those who
believe it. Declining to charge costs to a defendant who churlishly claims that
its government prohibits waivers of service may not ameliorate the sting. 2
The most significant feature of the last quarter of the twentieth century has
been the attraction and revulsion between the center and the fringes of political
power that in succession pulled Western European states together to form the
European Economic Community and fragmented the former states of the Soviet
Union and Yugoslavia. While sovereignty has never been more in doubt, the
observer may predict that claims of sovereignty will never be more vigorously
asserted. Cries of sovereignty will cloak governments' parochial protection for
local corporations, wrongdoers' scorched earth defenses, and practitioners'
preservation and acquisition of legal business. Complexity, ambiguity, and
change-and not just at the fringes-will mark international litigation as no
preserve for the sluggish and inastute. The international litigant walks in the
land of big feet, thin shoes, and tender toes.
IV
CONCLUSION

I express my hope that the development of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and judicial decisions rendered in the service of simplicity and
economy be made with care so as not to subordinate the ritual and formal
aspects of others' sovereignty. Our legal system pays homage to our sovereignty
myths with fictional agencies. Recognizing that should help us do a bit more to
respect other nations' sensitivities about sovereignty as we develop our internal
civil procedure.
As U.S. litigation and rulemaking ascend through stages, the higher stages
become less technical and more political. This trend should put trial judges and
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participants in the rulemaking process on notice to work with their eyes on the
political dimensions of the process-the executive, legislative, and international
dimensions of the particular issues. Of litigation in the thirteenth and
fourteenth centuries, Professor Robert Palmer remarked, "Inefficiency, anyway,
is never any society's worst enemy, no matter how annoying or expensive it
might be."' 3 Nor is complexity.
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